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THE PREROGATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT
THOMAS

J.

BURKE*

T HE jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court is derived from Sections
86 and 87 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota.
Section 86 declares that except as otherwise provided by the Constitution the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only
and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior
courts in the state. Section 87 provides that the Supreme Court
"shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo
warranto, certiorari and injunction and such other original and
remedial writs as may be necessary to the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction."
The grant of appellate and superintending jurisdictions and the
power to issue all necessary writs in aid of these jurisdictions is
clear. On these matters there is no need for construction. Whether
additional original jurisdiction exists is not so clear. The superintending control is a jurisdiction which is in a sense both appellate and
original. It is principally original because all proceedings under it
are independent proceedings and all process therein is directed to
the trial judge, who has been charged with denying justice or acting
beyond his jurisdiction. It is appellate in the sense that the Supreme
Court in reaching its decision reviews a judicial act of a trial judge
in some matter in litigation before him.
The difficult questions which faced the Supreme Court in its
early interpretations of these sections were to determine what
additional original jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution
and the nature and extent of this jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
found the answer to these questions in State v. Nelson County' and
2

in State v. Archibald.

In reaching its construction of the Constitution the Court leaned
heavily upon the decisions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Attorney General v. Blossom3 and Attorney General v. Chicago &

N. W. Ry. 4 The latter opinion was written by the famous Chief

*Chief Justice, Supreme Court of North Dakota. Text of an address delivered May
10, 1956, at the annual meeting of the North Dakota chapter of the Order of the Coif.

1.
2.
3.
4.

1 N.D. 88, 45 N.W. 33 (1890).
5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1896).
1 Wis. 317 (1853).
35 Wis. 425 (1874).
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Justice Ryan and its analysis of the questions involved was meticulously followed by Judge Corliss in the Archibald case.
As has been suggested the question was two-fold. First, did the
Supreme Court have the power to issue the writs mentioned in the
Constitution in proceedings other than those which were appellate
or supervisory in character? Second, if it had power to issue such
writs in such proceedings, did it have the power in all cases where
jurisdiction could be initiated by the issuance of one of the writs
mentioned?
Several considerations impelled the Court to hold that original
jurisdiction was granted. First it was said that the words, "except
as otherwise provided by this Constitution" used in connection with
the grant of appellate jurisdiction implied that elsewhere in the
Constitution there was a grant of additional jurisdiction. Secondly, the writs mentioned in Section 87 were, with the exception of the
writ of injunction, prerogative writs historically used to initiate
jurisdiction. Thirdly, of the writs mentioned there was at least one,
quo warranto, which could not be used in aid of appellate or
supervisory jurisdiction and the inclusion of this writ among the five
specifically enumerated gave character to all the rest and indicated
that the other writs mentioned could be used to found jurisdiction
as well as for other purposes.
Having determined that it had original jurisdiction, it remained
for the Court to determine the extent of that jurisdiction. The Constitution vested in the district courts the jurisdiction to issue the
same writs. Could it be that the framers of the Constitution intended to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the district courts and the
Supreme Court in all matters wherein jurisdiction might be acquired by the issuance of one of these writs? The Court decided they
had not. In reaching this conclusion the Court again referred to
the fact that the writs named, with the exception of the writ of
injunction, were originally used for prerogative purposes only, but
pointed out that these writs had come to be used for private as well
as public uses by the consent of the sovereign, and in many cases
were now used to inaugurate jurisdiction in unimportant and insignificant controversies. The Court's conclusion was expressed in
these words of Judge Corliss: "We are clear that the otherwise
broad and comprehensive import of the words conferring original
jurisdiction on this Court must be limited, by the rank of this
Court in the judiciary of the state, and the character of the other
powers vested in the Court, so that its original jurisdiction shall
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comport with its dignity and its high place among the tribunals of
the commonwealth, and thus the harmony of its powers will be preserved, the classes of jurisdiction conferred upon it - appellate,
superintending and original, - all, under such construction having
for their objects exalted duties, the final review of the judgments
of inferior courts, the control of their actions and the guarding and
conserving of the great interests and prerogatives of the sovereign
people and the liberty of the citizen by original, prompt, and final
action. The Court will then be symmetrical in its jurisdiction. Its
powers will then be homogeneous, all partaking of its high and
sovereign character, and not a heterogeneous mixture of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with some of the jurisdiction which is
uniformly invested in inferior courts. " The Court thus decided that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to issue original writs was limited to cases in which the
issuance of the writs named in the Constitution was originally
appropriate and possible under the common law. In defining the
limits of that jurisdiction the Court stated: "It is impossible to define
with precision the boundaries of this jurisdiction; but the general
outlines have been marked to our satisfaction in Attorney General
v. City of Eau Clair, 37 Wis. 400. We quote with approval the views
there expressed: 'It is not enough to put in motion the original
jurisdiction of this court that the question be publici juris; it should
be a question quod ad statum reipublicaepertinet, - one effecting
the sovereignty of the state, its franchises, or prerogatives or the
liberties of its people,"6 In so far as I can recall, this language
culled from a decision of a great Wisconsin Court has been repeated
by the North Dakota Supreme Court ever since in all cases where
it was necessary to define the limits of its original jurisdiction.
This limitation upon original jurisdiction does not mean that a
private citizen or corporation may not, as a relator, apply to the
Supreme Court for an original writ. The state lends the aid of its
prerogative writs to private corporations and citizens in all proper
cases. In such cases, however, the interest of the state must be
direct and not collateral. The Court does not give relief because of
any private rights of the relator but solely to uphold the sovereignty
of the state.7 The state is always the plaintiff, and the only plaintiff.
The relator is a mere incident who brings public injury to the
5. State ex tel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 371-72, 66 N.W. 234, 239 (1896).
6. State ex rel.Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 374, 66 N.W. 234, 240 (1896).
7. State ex tel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 374-76, 66 N.W. 234, 240,41 (1896).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

attention of the Court.s Furthermore, even in a case properly within
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court the relator is not entitled to a prerogative writ as a matter of right. Whether the Court
will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in cases coming within the
above rule is a matter within its sound judicial discretion, depending upon the facts in each particular case.' In the exercise of this
discretion the Court will consider whether entrusting the decision
to the district court would result in unreasonable delay or otherwise
result in failure or inadequacy of relief.1"
As to procedure, it must always be remembered that an information or petition addressed to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court must always be brought in the name of the state.1 This is
so even in cases where the proceeding is instituted at the instance
of the Attorney-General. Originally it was held that "except in cases
of habeas corpus, leave to file an information must be obtained from
the Attorney-General."-' In State v. Wilcox, however, this requirement was modified and it was held that the approval of the Attorney-General, while desirable, was not absolutely essential. There the
Court said, "Cases may possibly arise when this Court, for the
protection of grave public interests may deem it to be its duty to
override the express wishes of the Attorney-General with respect to
assuming original jurisdiction."' 3 Later in State v. Langer 14 it was
held that in a case where the Attorney-General was made a party
defendant, it was not necesary to request the Attorney-General to
institute the proceedings. Recent decisions of the Couit, however,
require a private relator to set forth in his petition that he has called
the alleged infringement upon the sovereignty of the state to the
attention of the Attorney-General and requested him to institute an
original proceeding but that the Attorney-General has refused or
unreasonably delayed so to do.15 Upon the filing of an application in
proper form the Supreme Court will issue an order to show cause
or direct the clerk to issue an alternative writ addressed to the respondent and returnable at a time convenient to the Court and the
parties.1 6 The respondent may appear by written motion to quash,
8. Meyers v. Bertsch, 60 N.D. 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1930).
9. State v. Holmes, 16 N.D. 457, 114 N.W. 367 (1908); State v. Wilcox, 11 N.D.
-329, 91 N.W. 955 (1902); State v. Norton, 20 N.D. 180, 127 N.W. 717 (1910).
10. State v. Thompson, 21 N.D. 426, 131 N.W. 231 (1911).
11. Meyers v. Bertsch, 60 N.D. 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1930).
12. State v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 88, 101, 45 N.W. 33, 38 (1890).
13. State v. Wilcox, 11 N.D. 329, 335, 91 N.W. 955, (1902).
14. 46 N.D. 462, 473, 117 N.W. 408 (1920).
15. State v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504 (1938).
16. Supreme Court Rule 10.
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by demurrer, or by answer and return. All issues that may arise in
the controversy, including questions of jurisdiction and those relating to the final disposition of the controversy may be raised,
without waiver, at one or different times, as may suit the convenience of the Court and the parties for the purpose of expedition.1 7 Upon the hearing when the facts are controverted, affidavits
and counter affidavits may be submitted. If the Court determines
that it is necessary to take testimony, it may hear the testimony
itself or refer the matter to a trial court or referee for the taking of
such testimony.1" I believe the Moodie case19 is the only one in
which the court has taken oral testimony itself.
In matters of this kind the practical question which always confronts a practicing attorney is whether the facts of his case make it
one within the original jurisdiction of the Court. In this connection
it should be pointed out that habeas corpus proceedings are not
governed by the rules which are applicable to other proceedings invoking original jurisdiction. These, of course, need not be brought
in the name of the state nor need any request be made to the
Attorney-General as a condition precedent to the filing of an
application for a writ. Futhermore, in such cases no question of
jurisdiction can arise, for the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in
every such case. As a matter of almost universal practice, however,
the Supreme Court refuses, in the exercise of its discretion, to take
jurisdiction of such cases until relief has been applied for in, and
refused by, a district court. The question of whether other controversies come within the original jurisdiction is at times a difficult
one, The Court has never attempted to define the limits of that
jurisdiction with more precision than it did in State v. Nelson, when
it first considered the question, and it has said that it will judge for
itself in each case whether the case is properly one within the
original jurisdiction and if it is, whether as a matter of discretion it
will assume jurisdiction.
The practicing attorney has therefore two questions to consider.
The first is whether the controversy with which he is concerned
involves the the sovereignty of the state, and if it does, whether the
interest of the state is direct or merely collateral. The second is
whether the district court is the forum in which he may find speedy
and just relief. In this regard it may be helpful to point out a few
17. Supreme Court Rule 12.
18. Supreme Court Rule 12.
19. State v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558 (1935).
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of the instances in which the Court has assumed jurisdiction and a
few in which it has refused.
The Supreme Court has alway assumed jurisdiction of controversies concerning the title to a state office.20 It has accepted
jurisdiction in matters concerning the right of a candidate to have
his name printed upon the ballot in state-wide elections. 2 1 Among
other controversies within the original jurisdiction are those concerning the right of franchise, 22 the right of state officers to their
pay,2 3 and the jurisdictional foundation of the orders of state boards
and commissions.

24

Some of the controversies which the Court has refused to accept
are those concerning the title to an office in a political party, 25 those
concerning the division of a county,2 6 the matter of the change of
location of a county seat, 27 taxpayers' actions, 281 and questions con29
cerning the discharge of the employees of a public board.
The list is not by any means intended to be complete; it is merely
illustrative. The volume of cases involving original jurisdiction in
this state is very large. I have not had time to prepare to exhaust the
subject nor if I had, would you have had time to listen to it. My
hope is that you will find some benefit in what I have said.

20. State v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558 (1935); State v. Robinson, 35 N.D.
410, 160 N.W. 512 (1916); State ex rel. Salisbury v. Vogel, 65 N.D. 137, 256 N.W. 404
(1934); State ex rel. Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935); State
ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N.D. 314, 182 N.W. 545 (1921).
21. State ex rel. Graham v. Hall, 73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736 (1944); State ex rel.
Sundfor v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942); State v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 55,
118 N.W. 141 (1908).
22. State v. Thompson, 21 N.D. 426, 131 N.W. 131 (1911); State v. Lavik, 9 N.D.
461, 83 N.W. 914 (1900); State v. Hall, 74 N.D. 426, 23 N.W.2d 44 (1946).
23. State v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, 142 N.W. 450, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 67 (1913);
State v. Kositzky, 44 N.D. 291, 175 N.W. 207 (1919).
24. State v. Aandahl, 47 N.D. 179, 181 N.W. 596 (1921).
25. State v. McLean, 35 N.D. 203, 157 N.W. 847 (1916).
26. State v. Fabrick, 17 N.D. 532, 117 N.W. 860 (1908).
27. State v. Gottbreht, 17 N.D. 543, 117 N.W. 864 (1908).
28. State v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504 (1938).
29. State v. Board of Higher Education, 78 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1956).

